eldorado.tu-dortmund.de/server/api/core/bitstreams/6364a940-d4d7-426b-99a7-5e0903fe2193/content
also holds with rel-
ative contracts or not will also be part of my investigation in this chapter.
9
It is assumed in Chapters 3 and 4 that the principal uses the contract to influ-
ence the effort made [...] that is even greater. A zero material payoff assumption would include situations
with negative utility9. Of course, no agent that maximizes his utility will sign such
a contract. But we have to mention that [...] Accordingly, the expected material payoff of principal one is
IP1 = pI1V − d1 − pI2I1V + pI1 I 2V + d2.
9Assume that = 1, the material payoff of the first agent to be zero and the material payoff of the second …